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The Use of Power Blocs of Integrated Corporate Directorships
to Articulate a Power Structure:
Case Study and Research Recommendations
F. Gregory Hayden,
Kellee R. Wood,
and
Asuman Kaya
The purpose here is the explanation of five related concerns. First, we explain a new
method to analyze and measure the network of interlocks among the directors of differ-
ent corporations. Second, we use the method articulated is used to analyze and describe
the network that forms the corporate power structure in which the Central Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact (CIC) is enmeshed. We have been greatly sur-
prised by the findings because the literature surveyed concerning corporate director over-
laps does not contain any examples of such a dense and extensive network of corporate
connections as exist in the CIC. Third, from the empirical base generated for the CIC,
we select the most dominant corporations. Fourth, we provide a literature review that is
related to the new method utilized. As scientists emphasize, context is imperative for
defining what is to be considered and interpreted. Thus, in order to make the literature
review more meaningful, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the new methodol-
ogy and its application before the literature review is presented. A new research and mea-
surement context needs to be demonstrated before we can know what past research base
is relevant. Since it is important both to relate past research to the methods used here
and to suggest future research, the review is presented after the CIC empirical base is
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derived and before the presentation of the fifth concern, which is an explanation of sug-
gested future research.
The CIC is an outgrowth of 1980 legislation approved by the federal government
for the establishment of compacts among states for the management of low-level radio-
active waste. Absent much progress in that direction, Congress amended the legislation
in 1985 with incentives and requirements for states.1 The CIC is a five-state compact
formed by Arkansas, Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. Technically, it is
governed by a five-person commission, with one representative from each state. In the
face of drastically decreased waste volumes and radioactivity levels, excess disposal
capacity nationwide, a developer in financial trouble, cost overruns, exorbitant costs to
develop new facilities, and the rejection of its license application to build a facility in
Nebraska, the CIC continues the expensive process of pursuing a disposal site. Why? As
stated above, to answer that question is one of the reasons for the application of the new
method to the CIC.
Within the five-state region of the CIC, the major nuclear generators are Entergy
Corporation, Entergy Louisiana, Entergy Arkansas, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating
Corporation, Gulf States Utilities Co., Nebraska Public Power District (government
owned), and Omaha Public Power District (government owned). The major generators
have had significant influence on the CIC and have provided most of the funding for
the CIC to pay the developer, American Ecology Corporation, and the major subcon-
tractor, Bechtel National, Inc. The generators follow the leadership of Entergy Corp.,
and Entergy’s liaison person to the CIC Commission serves on the CIC’s most impor-
tant policy committee. In short, Entergy has had the power to guide the policies of a
Commission that represents five states because Entergy is a dominant corporation in a
very powerful corporate structure that serves as a subgovernment for the several states.
Entergy’s web of influence is derived from overlapping corporate decision struc-
tures—decision structures for determining what happens with regard to economic,
social, and technological systems within the region. The collaborative decision making
of oligopolistic corporations that have interlocked their boards of directors has evolved
to be one of the most powerful decision-making institutions in Western society. In the
twelfth century, the most powerful economic institution was the medieval manor, in the
nineteenth century it was the family (where most economic ownership and business
decisions were made), and today the most powerful social and economic institution is
the network made up of translocked corporate organizations. Therefore, to understand
and explain economic or technological phenomena, it is imperative to articulate the cor-
porate planning network that surrounds the phenomena to be understood. This is espe-
cially true for technological systems adopted and guided by networks of translocked
corporations that span several states or geographical regions. This is shown below to be
the case with regard to the CIC and its management of low-level radioactive waste.
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Power Blocs and the Sharing of Power Blocs by Paired Corporations
In the last 100 years, numerous studies have articulated how the decisions of over-
lapping corporate boards are coordinated through interlocking directorships. Recently,
most such studies have originated in the sociology and management science literature.
A conclusion reached in the literature is that the boards of two different corporations
can effectively coordinate plans and decisions by interlocking directors through the
boards of two other corporations. Each such linear quadruple of corporations is called a
power bloc. The purpose of our study was to find the networking structure among firms
by finding all the power blocs among a set of corporations, in this case among corpora-
tions related to the CIC. The corporate power structure, the importance of particular
corporations within the structure, and the density and extension of the power structure
were derived from the power bloc concept. In addition, the number of different power
blocs that two particular corporations share was calculated. That is, the first and second
concerns, stated above, were achieved by measurements based on (1) the power bloc
concept and (2) the related measurement of the number of power blocs shared by paired
corporations. Neither had been calculated before in surveyed literature.
In the calculations presented below, the order of the corporations in the power bloc
was not considered important. If there were four corporations, A, B, C, and D, they
were counted as a power bloc if the four were connected by a path whereby, for example,
corporations A and B shared a director or directors, B and C shared a director or direc-
tors, and C and D shared a director or directors, or A<=>B<=>C<=>D. In many path
studies the order along a path is important, and, therefore, A<=>B<=>C<=>D would be
counted as one bloc and A<=>D<=>B<=>C as an additional bloc because its order is dif-
ferent. However, in this study they were counted as only one bloc. These two sets were
not counted as two different sets because if A and D can effectively reach each other for
decision making in the first set, then A can effectively coordinate with B, C, and D; that
is, the corporations are already capable of working together. They can coordinate activi-
ties and enforce plans without respect to the order of the four in the set. (The surprising
number of power blocs reported below would have been much greater if different orders
had been counted as additional sets.)
Let us further clarify a power bloc set with a real-world example from the findings
presented below. It is as follows:
Each oval contains the name of a corporation. The directed lines between the ovals
represent the exchange of one or more directors between corporations. The four corpo-
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rations combined together, as represented, is one power bloc set in a linear quadruple
format. As stated above, changing the order of the connections among the four was not
counted as additional sets in this study. The observation of this power bloc set alone
would be counted as one power bloc for each of the four corporations. With regard to
the number of power blocs shared by two corporations, the set illustrated above repre-
sents one shared power bloc between any two corporations in the set. As illustrated,
there is one power bloc shared by Peter Kiewit and Illinois Power, one shared by Berk-
shire Hathaway and Illinois Power, and so forth.
Power-bloc connections among boards are found to be consistent with other con-
nections among the same corporations. A case in point is the decision made recently by
the CEOs of Peter Kiewit, Berkshire Hathaway, and CalEnergy Co. to invest together to
acquire the public utility, MidAmerican Energy Co., in Iowa. More recently these inter-
ests have been lobbying Washington D.C. decision makers to rescind the Public Util-
ities Holding Company Act so they can extend their dominion through ownership of
other energy companies. “In fact, Mr. Buffet (CEO of Berkshire Hathaway) spoke with
legislators last year expressing his support for repeal” (Wall Street Journal, April 23,
2001), and David Sokol (CEO of CalEnergy Co.) has lobbied President Bush for the
same (Omaha World Herald, April 19, 24, 2001). Power bloc membership indicates other
common economic and political relationships.
Twenty different power blocs taken from the total list of power blocs found for the
72 corporations are listed in table 1. These power blocs, as translocked corporations,
form the basic structure analyzed in this study. It is a tightly woven network of some of
the world’s major public utility, financial, construction, waste disposal, and transporta-
tion corporations. Two corporations around which many other corporations are con-
nected in the system are Entergy Corporation and Peter Kiewit Sons’ (both are large
multinationals).
The first power bloc listed in table 1 demonstrates that Entergy shares one or more
directors with Peco Energy, which shares one or more directors with Illinois Power,
which shares one or more directors with Peter Kiewit. This type of translocking allows
these corporations to plan together and, therefore, to wield concerted and unified eco-
nomic and political power. First, a power bloc links extensive revenues, knowledge and
personnel, and assets; and, second, it allows for coordinated action and planning.
Third, and most important, a power bloc is interlocked with other power blocs for
expanding corporate power and government policymaking efforts far beyond an indi-
vidual bloc. Indeed, a casual review of table 1 indicates that different power blocs are
themselves interlocked with other power blocs. All twenty power blocs are overlapped
with other power blocs through one or more corporations. For example, not only do
Entergy and Peter Kiewit participate in particular power blocs together, they in turn pull
other blocs into a common domain, as they are each members of other blocs. The
expression of that can be seen in the recent announcement made by Entergy Corpora-
tion that it is going to build a new electric generation plant near Orient, Iowa. The site is
next to transmission lines owned by MidAmerican to carry the electricity to be pro-
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duced by Entergy (Des Moines Register, July 30, 2001). Peter Kiewit’s involvment in
MidAmerican was clarified earlier.
Finding the Power Structure: Data Collection and Analysis
The method used to find the power structure is explained in detail in order to allow
readers (1) to evaluate the legitimacy of the method and the resulting empirical base gen-
erated, (2) to duplicate the calculations for power structures relevant to other socioeco-
nomic problems, (3) to understand how the power bloc methodology is consistent with
the literature reviewed, and (4) to understand the relevance of a power-bloc definition of
a power structure to the recommendations for future research.
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1. Entergy<=>Peco Energy<=>Illinois Power<=>Peter Kiewit
2. Entergy<=>DuPont<=>DuPont Dow Elastomers<=>Peter Kiewit
3. Entergy<=>DuPont<=>BellSouth<=>Carolina Power & Light
4. Peter Kiewit<=>DuPont<=>JP Morgan<=>Bechtel
5. Entergy<=>DuPont<=>DuPont Dow Elastomers<=>JP Morgan
6. Peoples Energy<=>Waste Management Inc.<=>Union Pacific Resources<=>Chase Manhattan
7. Peoples Energy<=>Chicago Title and Trust<=>Peter Kiewit<=>Illinois Power
8. Entergy<=>Entergy Arkansas<=>Entergy Louisiana<=>New Orleans Public Service
9. Entergy<=>Entergy International<=>Entergy Louisiana<=>Entergy London
10. Peter Kiewit<=>Chicago Title Insurance<=>First Chicago Corp<=>BellSouth
11.
Florida Power & Light<=>Chemical Waste Management<=>Union Pacific Resources<=>Waste Man-
agement, Inc.
12. Illinois Power<=>Electric Energy<=>Chicago Title and Trust<=>Peoples Energy
13. CalEnergy<=>Chicago Title and Trust<=>Illinois Power<=>Peco Energy
14.
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating<=>Kansas City Power<=>Burlington Northern<=>Level 3 Commu-
nications
15.
Texas Commerce Bank National<=>Burlington Northern Inc.<=>Chicago Title and Trust<=>Peter
Kiewit
16.
Texas Commerce Bank National<=>Burlington Northern Inc.<=>Level 3 Communications<=>Peter
Kiewit
17. Duke Power<=>Texas Commerce Bank National<=>Chase Manhattan<=>Browning Ferris
18. Entergy<=>DuPont Dow Elastomers<=>DuPont<=>Bechtel
19. Peter Kiewit<=>Level 3 Communications<=>Burlington Northern Inc.<=>Chase Manhattan
20. Entergy<=>Peco Energy<=>Illinois Power<=>Chicago Title Insurance
Note: This sample of 20 power blocs is taken from the total list of power blocs found for the 72 corporations in this study.
Table 1. Twenty Different Power Blocs within the Central Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Compact’s Corporate Power Structure
The search for the CIC corporate power structure began with a list of the thirty-two
corporations that have been most involved with the CIC, the Nebraska Department of
Environmental Quality, and the Nebraska Department of Health. They were included
because of their involvement in the CIC development process. They have been involved
as developers, consulting firms, contractors, subcontractors, and as the nuclear electric
generators that provide funding. First, all the directors on the boards of the thirty-two
corporations for 1997 (the information year) were identified.2 Next, all the other corpo-
rate boards on which these directors also served were ascertained. Finally, the directors
on the corporate boards of the corporations interlocked with the original thirty-two cor-
porations were identified in order to ascertain all the other corporate boards on which
they were also directors, thereby interlocking these additional corporations. The total
listing contains 450 corporations. The list of 450 corporations was used, as explained
below, to identify corporations for power bloc analysis. Power bloc analysis was not com-
pleted for all 450 corporations.
The 450 corporations were arrayed in the same order across the rows and columns
of an n x n square matrix in order to specify to which other corporations each corpora-
tion in a row provided directors to the columnar corporations. (The 450 x 450 matrix is
not presented here.) Across each matrix row, a 1 was placed in the cell of the column of
the corporation with which the corporation in that row shared one or more directors.
The rows of some corporations had numerous cell entries, indicating numerous connec-
tions with other corporations, while other corporations had only one entry, sharing
directors with only one other corporation. After completion of the 450 x 450 matrix,
the number of cells with entries in each corporation row was summed and the result
rank ordered. Given a definite data break between corporations 70 and 71 in terms of
the total number of cells with entries in each row, the 70 corporations with the most ini-
tial directorship interlocks were selected for the power bloc analysis.
Two additional companies were added from the 450 corporations because of their
connection with the CIC, thus increasing the list to 72. Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD) was added because it is currently involved in supporting and financing the CIC
activities (all other nuclear generators so involved are represented in the 70 corpora-
tions selected). In addition, an elected director on OPPD’s board (OPPD is government
owned and operated) is on the board of Bridges Investment Fund, so Bridges was added
to the list as well. Given these connections, to be thorough, OPPD and Bridges were
added to ascertain their significance; however, as is shown below (table 2), neither was
found to be a dominant corporation.
The 72 corporations are listed in column 1 of table 2. The corporations listed in
column 1 are assigned numbers in consecutive order, and those assigned numbers are
used to represent the same corporations in all tables and figures presented below, as well
as in the text. Readers familiar with the names on the the list know that some of these
corporations have recently merged (Chase Manhattan and JP Morgan, for example),
others have changed their name (CalEnergy changed to MidAmerican Energy Co.), and
676 F. Gregory Hayden, Kellee R. Wood, and Asuman Kaya
T
ab
le
2
.
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
in
th
e
C
en
tr
al
In
te
rs
ta
te
L
o
w
-L
ev
el
R
ad
io
ac
ti
ve
W
as
te
C
o
m
p
ac
t:
A
T
ra
n
sl
o
ck
ed
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
o
f
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
P
o
w
er
B
lo
cs
(1
)
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
N
o
.
&
N
am
e
(2
)
T
o
ta
l
P
o
w
er
B
lo
cs
In
vo
lv
ed
(3
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
2
(4
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
C
o
rp
s
R
ea
ch
ed
(5
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
4
(6
)
C
o
l.
2
D
iv
id
ed
b
y
C
o
l.
4
(7
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
6
(8
)
R
an
k
S
u
m
o
f
C
o
ls
.
2
,
4
,
&
6
(9
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
8
1
.
A
o
n
C
o
rp
.
2
8
0
1
5
4
1
6
6
.8
3
2
6
3
2
7
.8
3
1
5
2
.
A
ll
te
l
3
5
5
7
2
0
4
7
1
.7
5
5
7
5
6
.7
5
5
5
3
.
B
ec
h
te
l
5
7
1
9
6
7
0
.5
6
7
2
1
4
.5
6
7
1
4
.
B
el
l
S
o
u
th
C
o
rp
.
1
0
4
3
7
3
0
2
7
3
.4
7
3
6
1
3
7
.4
7
3
7
5
.
B
er
k
sh
ir
e
H
at
h
aw
ay
4
2
1
1
0
3
3
1
8
1
2
.7
6
6
4
6
6
.7
6
1
0
6
.
B
ro
w
n
in
g
F
er
ri
s
5
0
5
0
1
9
4
8
2
.6
3
4
2
7
1
.6
3
5
1
7
.
B
u
rl
in
gt
o
n
N
o
rt
h
er
n
2
9
5
1
3
4
4
4
6
.7
0
2
7
3
4
5
.7
0
1
3
8
.
B
u
rl
in
gt
o
n
R
es
o
u
rc
es
4
1
7
1
1
3
3
1
9
1
2
.6
4
7
4
6
2
.6
4
1
1
9
.
B
u
rl
in
gt
o
n
In
d
u
st
ri
es
2
8
5
9
2
1
4
3
1
.3
3
6
4
5
0
.3
3
5
9
1
0
.
B
u
si
n
es
s
M
en
's
A
ss
u
ra
n
ce
5
4
4
8
2
8
2
9
1
.9
3
5
5
8
3
.9
3
4
8
1
1
.
B
ri
d
ge
s
In
ve
st
.
F
u
n
d
1
8
6
3
1
9
4
9
0
.9
5
6
9
3
7
.9
5
6
3
1
2
.
C
ar
o
li
n
a
P
o
w
er
1
2
6
7
1
3
6
3
0
.9
2
7
0
2
5
.9
2
6
6
1
3
.
C
al
E
n
er
gy
C
o
.
In
c.
5
7
0
2
3
7
1
0
1
5
.4
1
1
6
2
2
.4
1
2
1
4
.
C
h
em
fi
rs
t
In
c.
1
6
6
4
1
5
6
0
1
.0
7
6
8
3
2
.0
7
6
4
1
5
.
C
h
em
ic
al
W
as
te
M
gt
.
In
c.
1
6
3
3
1
3
5
1
3
4
.6
6
3
3
2
0
2
.6
6
2
8
1
6
.
C
en
tr
al
S
ta
te
s
In
d
em
n
it
y
8
3
3
9
2
5
3
4
3
.3
2
3
8
1
1
1
.3
2
3
9
1
7
.
C
h
as
e
M
an
h
at
ta
n
7
5
4
0
3
4
1
6
2
.2
1
5
0
1
1
1
.2
1
4
0
1
8
.
C
h
ic
ag
o
T
it
le
In
s.
5
5
4
4
4
5
3
1
2
.3
1
9
6
1
1
.3
1
4
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
on
n
ex
t
p
a
ge
T
ab
le
2
—
C
on
ti
n
u
ed (1
)
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
N
o
.
&
N
am
e
(2
)
T
o
ta
l
P
o
w
er
B
lo
cs
In
vo
lv
ed
(3
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
2
(4
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
C
o
rp
s
R
ea
ch
ed
(5
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
4
(6
)
C
o
l.
2
D
iv
id
ed
b
y
C
o
l.
4
(7
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
6
(8
)
R
an
k
S
u
m
o
f
C
o
ls
.
2
,
4
,
&
6
(9
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
8
1
9
.
C
h
ic
ag
o
T
it
le
&
T
ru
st
4
7
6
9
4
0
7
1
1
.9
0
1
1
5
2
7
.9
0
9
2
0
.
C
it
ic
o
rp
3
2
5
8
1
8
5
2
1
.7
8
5
6
5
1
.7
8
5
7
2
1
.
C
o
n
A
gr
a
In
c.
6
2
7
1
4
3
5
1
4
.5
8
3
6
8
4
.5
8
1
2
2
.
D
u
k
e
P
o
w
er
2
8
6
0
1
9
5
0
1
.4
7
6
2
4
8
.4
7
6
0
2
3
.
D
u
P
o
n
t
2
9
2
1
4
3
3
2
0
8
.8
5
2
2
3
3
3
.8
5
1
4
2
4
.
D
u
P
o
n
t
D
o
w
E
la
st
o
m
er
s
1
1
7
3
4
3
4
1
7
3
.4
4
3
7
1
5
4
.4
4
3
4
2
5
.
E
le
ct
ri
c
E
n
er
gy
1
1
7
3
5
2
5
3
5
4
.6
8
3
2
1
4
6
.6
8
3
5
2
6
.
E
n
te
rp
ri
se
S
h
ip
p
in
g
3
6
5
6
1
3
6
4
2
.7
7
4
1
5
1
.7
7
5
8
2
7
.
E
n
te
rg
y
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
3
1
9
1
2
2
3
3
8
1
3
.8
7
5
3
5
5
.8
7
1
2
2
8
.
E
n
te
rg
y
A
rk
an
sa
s
1
8
9
2
4
1
8
5
3
1
0
.5
0
1
4
2
1
7
.5
0
2
4
2
9
.
E
n
te
rg
y
L
o
u
is
ia
n
a
1
6
7
2
8
1
8
5
4
9
.2
8
1
8
1
9
4
.2
8
3
0
3
0
.
E
n
te
rg
y
M
is
si
ss
ip
p
i
1
6
6
2
9
2
1
4
4
7
.9
0
2
5
1
9
4
.9
0
2
9
3
1
.
E
n
te
rg
y
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
1
8
1
2
6
2
1
4
5
8
.6
2
2
4
2
1
0
.6
2
2
7
3
2
.
E
n
te
rg
y
L
o
n
d
o
n
1
8
7
2
5
1
9
5
1
9
.8
4
1
6
2
1
5
.8
4
2
5
3
3
.
F
ir
st
C
o
m
m
er
ce
C
o
rp
.
1
5
8
3
2
1
7
5
9
9
.2
9
1
7
1
8
4
.2
9
3
2
3
4
.
F
ir
st
C
h
ic
ag
o
C
o
rp
.
1
9
7
2
3
3
8
9
5
.1
8
3
1
2
4
0
.1
8
2
1
3
5
.
F
lo
ri
d
a
P
o
w
er
&
L
ig
h
t
6
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
.9
4
5
4
9
5
.9
4
4
2
3
6
.
G
u
lf
S
o
u
th
In
c.
3
8
5
4
1
5
6
1
2
.5
3
4
5
5
5
.5
3
5
6
3
7
.
G
u
ar
an
te
e
L
if
e
In
s.
1
2
2
3
3
3
1
2
5
3
.9
4
3
5
1
5
6
.9
4
3
3
3
8
.
Il
li
n
o
is
P
o
w
er
C
o
.
5
5
5
3
5
5
1
1
0
.0
9
1
5
6
2
0
.0
9
3
3
9
.
Il
li
n
o
va
C
o
rp
.
5
2
0
6
4
6
2
1
1
.3
0
1
3
5
7
7
.3
0
6
4
0
.
In
te
rn
'l.
S
h
ip
h
o
ld
in
g
2
1
5
1
8
1
8
5
5
1
1
.9
4
1
0
2
4
4
.9
4
2
0
4
1
.
JP
M
o
rg
an
3
7
5
5
2
6
3
1
1
.4
2
6
3
6
4
.4
2
5
4
4
2
.
K
an
sa
s
C
it
y
P
o
w
er
6
6
4
1
2
9
2
8
2
.2
8
4
7
9
7
.2
8
4
1
4
3
.
L
ev
el
3
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s
4
8
4
8
3
9
8
1
2
.4
1
8
5
3
5
.4
1
8
4
4
.
M
ag
m
a
P
o
w
er
2
7
9
1
6
3
2
2
3
8
.7
2
2
3
3
1
9
.7
2
1
6
4
5
.
M
er
ri
ll
L
yn
ch
1
6
6
5
1
3
6
5
1
.2
3
6
6
3
0
.2
3
6
5
4
6
.
M
er
ca
n
ti
le
B
an
k
o
f
K
an
.
4
3
5
3
2
6
3
2
1
.6
5
5
9
7
0
.6
5
5
2
4
7
.
M
o
rg
an
K
ee
ga
n
1
2
6
8
8
7
0
1
.5
0
6
1
2
1
.5
0
6
8
4
8
.
M
o
rr
is
o
n
K
n
u
d
se
n
2
1
0
1
9
3
6
1
1
5
.8
3
2
9
2
5
1
.8
3
1
8
4
9
.
N
ew
O
rl
ea
n
s
P
u
b
li
c
S
er
vi
ce
2
0
5
2
1
2
3
3
9
8
.9
1
2
1
2
3
6
.9
1
2
2
5
0
.
N
o
rt
h
er
n
E
le
ct
ri
c
2
7
9
1
7
3
1
2
6
9
.0
0
2
0
3
1
9
.0
0
1
7
5
1
.
N
at
io
n
al
C
o
m
m
.
B
an
k
C
o
rp
.
1
1
6
9
9
6
8
1
.2
2
6
7
2
1
.2
2
6
9
5
2
.
O
m
ah
a
P
u
b
li
c
P
o
w
er
D
is
t.
3
7
2
5
7
2
0
.6
0
7
1
8
.6
0
7
2
5
3
.
P
ec
o
E
n
er
gy
1
0
3
3
8
3
5
1
4
2
.9
4
4
0
1
4
0
.9
4
3
6
5
4
.
P
eo
p
le
s
E
n
er
gy
C
o
rp
.
1
7
4
2
7
3
2
2
4
5
.4
4
3
0
2
1
1
.4
4
2
6
5
5
.
P
et
er
K
ie
w
it
&
S
o
n
s'
4
8
9
7
3
5
1
5
1
3
.9
7
4
5
3
7
.9
7
7
5
6
.
R
JR
N
ab
is
co
2
0
6
2
0
3
3
2
1
6
.2
4
2
8
2
4
5
.2
4
1
9
5
7
.
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
B
en
ef
it
L
if
e
1
0
7
0
8
7
1
1
.2
5
6
5
1
9
.2
5
7
0
5
8
.
S
an
ta
F
e
E
n
er
gy
R
es
o
u
rc
es
5
2
4
9
2
3
4
0
2
.2
6
4
9
7
7
.2
6
4
9
5
9
.
S
ca
S
er
vi
ce
s
2
5
6
1
1
5
6
2
1
.6
7
5
8
4
1
.6
7
6
1
6
0
.
S
ca
n
a
C
o
rp
.
5
0
5
1
2
3
4
1
2
.1
7
5
1
7
5
.1
7
5
0
6
1
.
S
ys
te
m
E
n
er
gy
R
es
.
2
0
5
2
2
1
8
5
6
1
1
.3
9
1
2
2
3
4
.3
9
2
3
6
2
.
S
ym
an
te
c
C
o
rp
.
5
9
4
4
2
6
3
3
2
.2
7
4
8
8
7
.2
7
4
3
6
3
.
S
o
u
th
er
n
G
u
lf
R
ai
lw
ay
1
6
5
3
0
1
8
5
7
9
.1
7
1
9
1
9
2
.1
7
3
1
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
on
n
ex
t
p
a
ge
T
ab
le
2
—
C
on
ti
n
u
ed (1
)
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
N
o
.
&
N
am
e
(2
)
T
o
ta
l
P
o
w
er
B
lo
cs
In
vo
lv
ed
(3
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
2
(4
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
C
o
rp
s
R
ea
ch
ed
(5
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
4
(6
)
C
o
l.
2
D
iv
id
ed
b
y
C
o
l.
4
(7
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
6
(8
)
R
an
k
S
u
m
o
f
C
o
ls
.
2
,
4
,
&
6
(9
)
R
an
k
O
rd
er
o
f
C
o
l.
8
6
4
.
T
ex
as
C
o
m
m
.
B
an
k
N
at
io
n
al
5
9
4
5
2
3
4
2
2
.5
7
4
4
8
4
.5
7
4
7
6
5
.
T
ex
tr
o
n
5
7
4
7
2
8
3
0
2
.0
4
5
3
8
7
.0
4
4
4
6
6
.
U
n
io
n
P
ac
if
ic
R
es
o
u
rc
es
5
9
4
6
2
5
3
6
2
.3
6
4
6
8
6
.3
6
4
5
6
7
.
U
ti
li
ty
H
o
ld
in
gs
4
7
5
2
1
8
5
8
2
.6
1
4
3
6
7
.6
1
5
3
6
8
.
V
al
m
o
n
t
5
4
4
5
3
6
1
2
1
5
.1
1
2
5
9
5
.1
1
5
6
9
.
W
as
te
M
an
ag
em
en
t
In
c.
1
0
7
3
6
2
5
3
7
4
.2
8
3
4
1
3
6
.2
8
3
8
7
0
.
W
es
te
rn
R
es
o
u
rc
es
1
4
6
6
9
6
9
1
.5
6
6
0
2
4
.5
6
6
7
7
1
.
W
o
lf
C
re
ek
N
u
cl
ea
r
2
5
6
2
1
2
6
6
2
.0
8
5
2
3
9
.0
8
6
2
7
2
.
Z
yc
o
C
o
rp
.
6
2
4
3
2
1
4
6
2
.9
5
3
9
8
5
.9
5
4
6
A
ve
ra
ge
1
6
8
.5
8
2
5
.5
3
5
.6
4
1
9
9
.7
5
N
ot
es
:
(1
)
C
o
lu
m
n
2
is
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
if
fe
re
n
t
p
o
w
er
b
lo
cs
in
w
h
ic
h
th
e
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
in
co
lu
m
n
1
is
a
m
em
b
er
.(
2
)
C
o
lu
m
n
4
is
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
if
fe
re
n
t
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s
th
at
th
e
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
in
co
lu
m
n
1
re
ac
h
es
b
y
sh
ar
in
g
p
o
w
er
b
lo
cs
w
it
h
th
e
o
th
er
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s.
(S
ee
fi
gu
re
5
fo
r
a
m
at
ri
x
li
k
e
th
e
7
2
x
7
2
m
at
ri
x
u
se
d
to
fi
n
d
co
lu
m
n
4
to
ta
ls
.)
(3
)
C
o
lu
m
n
8
w
as
fo
u
n
d
to
id
en
ti
fy
th
e
2
4
co
re
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
C
IC
p
o
w
er
st
ru
ct
u
re
.
others have gained new relationships (Kiewit has merged investment funds with
DuPont) since 1997.
Determining Power Blocs for Each Corporation
Power blocs were determined for the 72 corporations (not for the total 450 corpora-
tions). To determine the power blocs to which each corporation belongs, the 72 corpo-
rations were entered into an n x n adjacency matrix, with the 72 corporations arrayed in
the same order for the rows and columns of the matrix. Neither an exact mathematical
algorithm nor computer program exists for finding the power blocs for each of the 72
corporations.3 Thus, the linear-quadruple set of power blocs for each corporation was
found as follows. Assume five corporations, A, B, C, D, and E, are entered into a hypo-
thetical matrix, as in figure 1. The row corporations are the corporations that deliver
directors to the columnar corporations. Each cell with a 1 represents the sharing of a
director or directors between the row corporation and the columnar corporation. The
power blocs for a corporation can be found, as indicated by the directed dashed line for
corporation D. A power bloc is found by reading across row 4 to a cell with an entry,
such as cell (4,3), and then going up (and down) in that column to an entry, for example,
cell (2,3). Corporation D is involved in a different power bloc with each of the corpora-
tions indicated (with cell entries) in the row of that cell (row 2). This example indicates
the power bloc D<=>C<=>B<=>A. Using this procedure leads to duplicates, because in
this study a difference in order does not make for a different set. For example, beginning
with cell (1,4), bloc A<=>D<=>B<=>C is found. This is the same as the prior bloc, except
in a different order. The same is found when the power blocs for corporation B are
sought; for example, B<=>C<=>D<=>A is another duplicate. This means all the dupli-
cates must be identified and deleted.
Power Blocs of Integrated Corporate Directorships 681
Figure 1. Hypothetical Matrix
After the 72 x 72 matrix was completed, the total number of blocs for each corpora-
tion was determined and the thousands of sets of four corporations each were entered
into the computer program Excel.4 Since different corporations belong to the same
bloc, finding each individual corporation’s blocs one at a time means (as explained with
the hypothetical example above) there are numerous bloc duplications if the totals for
the corporations are summed. Thus, the power blocs of all corporations were integrated
into one database and the total searched for duplicates with the assistance of Excel. The
duplicates were deleted, and the total number of different power blocs for each corpora-
tion was determined. The large number of different power blocs for each corporation is
reported in column 2 of table 2 (and later utilized as one ingredient in determining the
most dominant corporations). The number of power blocs reported in column 2 of
table 2 indicates the dense translocked network in which the CIC is enmeshed. For
example, Peter Kiewit is a member of 489 different power blocs with the 72 corpora-
tions; this is 489 different sets of four linearly connected corporations among 72 corpo-
rations. Entergy is involved in 319 different power blocs, CalEnergy participates in 570,
Illinois Power serves in 555 different overlapping blocs, Entergy Arkansas is a member
of 189, and so forth. The average number of power blocs for the 72 corporations is
168.58. The rank order of the number of blocs in column 2 is reported in column 3 of
table 2.
The system functions as a series of sets in which three corporations are held the
same in a large number of sets, with the fourth member being different in each set until
the first three have connected and coordinated with a number of other corporations. In
this way, three corporations are a stable force coordinating activities with all of the
fourth corporations, one in each different set. An example of actual corporations (using
the corporations’ identification numbers from table 2) illustrates the functioning of this
system. A system of three being held constant and the fourth changing is as follows:
Power-Bloc Set No. Corporation’s Position in Power-Bloc Set
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1 55<=>38<=>43<=>5
2 55<=>38<=>43<=>7
3 55<=>38<=>43<=>8
4 55<=>38<=>43<=>13
5 55<=>38<=>43<=>18
Next, corporations function to hold constant what was one of the corporations in
the fourth position, along with two of the original positions (first and second) being
held constant, and, one at a time, start interlocking with other corporations in place of
one of the corporations that was originally held stable in the third position. As illus-
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trated in the next five bloc sets, corporation 18 (Chicago Title Insurance) from the
fourth position of bloc-set 5, immediately above, is held constant, and corporations in
the third position are changed from corporation 43 to 1, 19, 21, 25, and 68 as follows:
Power-Bloc Set No. Corporation’s Position in Power-Bloc Set
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
6 55<=>38<=>1<=>18
7 55<=>38<=>19<=>18
8 55<=>38<=>21<=>18
9 55<=>38<=>25<=>18
10 55<=>38<=>68<=>18
Next, corporation 13 (CalEnergy Co. Inc.) from bloc-set 4 is held constant in
bloc-sets 11 through 15 with corporations in the third position, as follows:
Power-Bloc Set No. Corporation’s Position in Power-Bloc Set
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
11 55<=>38<=>8<=>13
12 55<=>38<=>18<=>13
13 55<=>38<=>19<=>13
14 55<=>38<=>21<=>13
15 55<=>38<=>68<=>13
This process may continue until all selected corporations in the fourth position
have been held constant in a series of sets. Then, all the corporations in the third posi-
tion of sets 6 through 15 will be changed one by one. Next, a different position will be
changed one at a time. For example, each corporation in the third and fourth positions
will be held constant and changes made in the corporations in the second position. The
process continues until corporation 55 (Peter Kiewit) has hundreds of different overlap-
ping blocs stacked upon each other, with each corporation surrounded and integrated
through many different power blocs. In turn, each of the corporations in blocs 1
through 15 is included as a member of completely different bloc-sets, thus conjoining
more and more blocs and corporations. For example, corporation 55 is included as a
member of sets of blocs that do not contain any of the other corporations in sets 1
through 15, thereby connecting those sets with the ones in sets 1 through 15. This
explains how so many corporations are reached, but more importantly, it demonstrates
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how each corporation has its decision makers so completely integrated with other cor-
porations through interconnected translocked power blocs.
Number of Power Blocs Shared Between Corporations
Excel was next utilized to determine the total number of corporations with which
each of the 72 corporations shares power blocs with the other 71 corporations for the 72
corporations listed in Table 2. Figure 2 contains the results of that search in matrix for-
mat for the 24 most dominant core corporations (their selection is explained below).
The matrices for the 24 core corporations (in figures 2 and 5) are utilized to demonstrate
the 72 x 72 matrix (which is too large to reprint here)5 as well as to explain the relation-
ships among the 24 dominant enterprises. Figure 2 is an adjacency matrix of the num-
ber of different power blocs shared by paired corporations among the 24 core
corporations. The list of 24 corporations is arrayed in the same order across the rows
and columns of figure 2. The list of corporations and their numbers in figure 2 is com-
posed of 24 corporations taken from the 72 corporations in column 1 of table 2. The
gaps in the identification numbers (for example, Aon Corp. is 1 and the next corpora-
tion, Berkshire Hathaway, is 5) are due to some of the 72 corporations not being
included in the final list of 24 dominant corporations. The purpose of including the
numbers along with the corporate names in the matrix is so particular cells in the matrix
can be identified in the conventional manner. For example, the cell that indicates the
number of power blocs shared by Entergy Corporation (27) and Illinois Power Co. (38)
is designated as cell (27, 38) for row 27 and column 38.
Reading the cells across each row in figure 2 reveals the total number of power blocs
the corporation in that row shares with each column corporation. The numbers in the
cells in figure 2 for the 24 corporations are taken from the cells between the same two
corporations in the 72 x 72 matrix. As examples, Berkshire Hathaway shares 86 differ-
ent power blocs with CalEnergy, 99 with Illinois Power, and 88 with Peter Kiewit;
Burlington Northern is in 79 different power blocs with Chicago Title Insurance and 62
with CalEnergy; DuPont is paired with Peter Kiewit in 106 different power blocs, while
Entergy Corp. is in 22 with DuPont. Many different cells contain the same power bloc:
for example, power bloc 23<=>55<=>18<=>38 is found in adjacency cells (23,55),
(23,18), (23,38), (55,18), (55,38), and (18,38). But power bloc 23<=>55<=>18<=>38 is
not the only power bloc in those cells—as illustrated, cell (55,18) contains 114 power
blocs. That bloc is only one of 114 blocs represented in cell (55,18). The representation of
each power bloc in multi-cells and the representation of multi-blocs in a cell demonstrate the over-
lap thesis for the integration of the different organizations. The interest is not just in the inten-
sity of interlocking ties between two corporations but, instead, in the fact that every bloc
which a corporation shares with another corporation is connected to blocs containing
additional corporations and therefore additional corporate interlocks. There are few
stand-alone corporations; corporations range far and wide, but there are no “lone rang-
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ers” in the world of cooperative oligopolies. Corporate power comes from reciprocal
connections in a collective structure.
The matrix in figure 2 is converted to a digraph in figure 3 for the 24 most powerful
corporations in the system. The lines in figure 3 do not represent the direct exchange of
directors between the connected corporations, as is often the representation of such
digraphs. The only utilization of the direct exchange of directors in this article is the
original 450 x 450 matrix, which is conceptually different from the concern in figures 2
and 3. Each line (edge) between corporations in figure 3 represents the total number of
different power blocs in which the two corporations are members. More correctly, there
should be, for example, 105 lines between Illinois Power and Peter Kiewit, with one line
representing each different power bloc shared, as indicated in cell (38,55). Instead, to
make the digraph in figure 3 readable, one line is used to represent the number of power
blocs in the cell that joins the paired corporations in figure 2.
The importance of the paired connections found in figures 2 and 3 can be assessed
by reviewing the relationship between Texas Commerce Bank National and American
Ecology Corporation (AEC). Texas Commerce Bank National has been AEC’s bank.
AEC was chosen by the CIC Commission to serve as a project developer and has been
suffering a deteriorating financial condition since the 1980s. As AEC’s various waste
centers continued to fail, and to create heavy costs and adverse liability positions, AEC
also suffered losses in revenue and asset value. The company paid too much for new pro-
jects, the asset value of which had to be written down, and in some cases the projects
closed. AEC was selected as the developer by both the CIC and the Southwestern Com-
pact but failed to get the approval necessary to build disposal sites in both California
and Nebraska. Not surprisingly, investment houses dropped AEC stock from their port-
folios, and AEC’s stock price continued to fall. What has been surprising to observers
has been the reluctance of Texas Commerce to foreclose on AEC. Texas Commerce rec-
ognized AEC’s financial condition and even went so far as to require that an account be
established whereby AEC’s revenues went to Texas Commerce, where they were swept
into payment flows as determined by Texas Commerce. Observers continued to ask:
Why is Texas Commerce sticking with that small failing company with a bad environ-
mental record and a worse financial and managerial record? A look at figure 4 suggests
an answer: It is clear that Texas Commerce is woven into the interorganizational net-
work that wants AEC supported in its efforts to build low-level radioactive waste sites.
Figure 4 is a digraph of 23 of the 72 corporations that share one or more power
blocs with Texas Commerce. Each directed line between a corporate node and Texas
Commerce has two numbers. The first number is the total number of power blocs
shared with Texas Commerce. For example, Burlington Northern is a member of 41
blocs in which Texas Commerce is also a member. In addition, Burlington Northern
shares power blocs with 20 of the other 22 corporations surrounding Texas Commerce.
A few examples of the other 20 are as follows: Burlington Northern is involved in 47
power blocs with Berkshire Hathaway, 62 with CalEnergy, 79 with Chicago Title Insur-
ance, 78 with Chicago Title and Trust, and 101 with Level 3 Communications. The sec-
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ond number, which is in parentheses, is the total number of corporations with which
the corporation shares power blocs among the 72 corporations. Burlington Northern,
for example, shares power blocs with 44 of the 72 corporations. Other examples help to
further demonstrate that the network is extensive, dense, and woven tightly around
Texas Commerce. CalEnergy shares four blocs with Texas Commerce, is involved in
power blocs with 37 of the 72 corporations, and is paired in blocs with 14 of the 23 cor-
porations surrounding Texas Commerce. The number of blocs that CalEnergy shares
with some of the 23 corporations are as follows: Berkshire Hathaway, 86; Burlington
Northern, 62; Chicago Title Insurance, 112; Chicago Title and Trust, 106; ConAgra,
111; Illinois Power, 120; Illinova, 125; and Level 3 Communications, 111. Another
example is Illinois Power, which directly shares only one bloc with Texas Commerce, yet
has power extensions with others surrounding the bank. Illinois Power shares power
blocs with 55 of the 72 corporations and is paired within blocs with 18 of the 23 corpo-
rations around Texas Commerce in figure 4, some of which are as follows: Aon, 104;
Berkshire Hathaway, 99; Burlington Resources, 98; CalEnergy, 120; Chicago Title
Insurance, 112; Chicago Title and Trust, 101; ConAgra, 132; Illinova, 95; and Level 3
Communications, 96. As noted above, corporations seldom stand alone; in short, it is
the collective that is the locus of power and decision making, not the individual
corporation.
Number of Other Corporations Reached by Each Corporation
Figure 2 is converted into figure 5, which is an adjacency matrix that shows the cells
with entries in figure 2. The cells in figure 5 with a 1 indicate corporations that are part-
ners in blocs. (The 1 is not in the cells to represent a direct exchange of directors
between the two corporations.) The row-total column of figure 5 is the total number of
different corporations among the 24 core corporations with which the corporation in
each row shares power blocs. While the cell information in each row in figure 2 indi-
cates the intensity of blocs shared with other corporations, figure 5 demonstrates the
breadth of connectiveness. The matrix row total in figure 5 for the 24 corporations is
the total number of the other 23 dominant corporations with which each row corpora-
tion shares a power bloc. As illustrated, Illinois Power is integrated with 100 percent (23
corporations) of the other corporations. All except 4 corporations share blocs with 17
(74 percent) or more of the other corporations. Of the cells in figure 5 with the potential
to have entries, there are entries in 77 percent of those cells.
The row totals for the 72 x 72 matrix constructed the same as figure 5 are reported
in column 4 of table 2. The average for column 4 of table 2 is 25.53; Illinois Power is
involved in power blocs with 55 of the 72 corporations, Chicago Title Insurance with 45
other corporations, CalEnergy with 37, Peter Kiewit with 35, and Entergy Corp. with
23. Each corporation’s ranking with respect to the total number of corporations with
which that corporation shares power blocs is in column 5 of table 2.
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Average Depth of Power Blocs for Each Corporation Reached
Column 6 of table 2 is the result of dividing column 2 by column 4 in order to find
the average number of power blocs each corporation has with other corporations with
which blocs are shared. For example, CalEnergy is involved in 570 different power blocs
(column 2) and through those power blocs reaches 37 corporations (column 4). This
means that for each of the corporations with which CalEnergy is connected, it is
involved, on the average, in 15.41 different power blocs with each corporation. The
average of column 6 for the 72 corporations is 5.64. The rank order of column 6 is
found in column 7.
Selection of the Dominant Corporations of the Power Structure
The dominant corporations of the CIC power structure were selected by adding the
different databases contained in columns 2, 4, and 6 of table 2. This sum is contained in
column 8 of table 2 and rank ordered in column 9. The sum of the original data in col-
umns 2, 4, and 6 was used instead of the average of their rankings in columns 3, 5, and 7
because the original data allow for the uneven intervals among the data points to influ-
ence the final ranking. For instance, the rank distinction among the first, second, and
third (column 3) corporations is only one, while in reality, as listed in column 2, there is
a power-bloc difference of 57 between the first and second corporations and a difference
of 15 between the 2nd and 3rd corporations. The 24 dominant or core corporations are
listed in alphabetical order in column 1 of table 3, with their aggregate ranking coeffi-
cient from column 8 of table 2 reported in column 2 of table 3, and the rank order of
column 2 is found in column 3. The average number of power blocs in column 2 is 368
for the 24 dominant corporations, compared with 166 for the 72 corporations. Total
assets, equity, and revenue are listed in columns 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Most of these
corporations are global giants with strong financial statements. Their power extends far
beyond their separate financial statements because they are bound together into a col-
lective decision and planning structure. The collective whole provides political, eco-
nomic, and social power beyond their individual financial statements.
Connections Not Included in Rankings
Some directorship connections among corporations which would have indicated
an increased network density and higher level of interaction among particular corpora-
tions were not included in this analysis. First, it is recognized that in any data-collection
endeavor of this type some empirical base is missed—corporate connections that would
have increased network density. Second, secondary and initial interlocks among corpo-
rations were not included in the determination of power rankings. In addition, officers
from one corporation sitting on another corporation’s board were not counted.
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(1)
Corporation No. and Name
(2)
Power
Blocs
Rank
Sum
(3)
Rank
Order
of
Col. 2
(4)
Total Assets
($000)
(5)
Total
Equity
($000)
(6)
Total
Revenue
($000)
1. Aon Corp. 327.83 15 18,691,200 2,822,100 5,750,600
5. Berkshire Hathaway 466.76 10 56,110,900 31,455,200 10,430,000
7. Burlington Resources 462.64 11 5,821,000 3,016,000 2,000,000
8. Burlington Northern 345.70 13 21,336,000 6,812,000 8,413,000
13. CalEnergy Co. Inc. 622.41 2 7,487,626 765,326 2,270,911
18. Chicago Title Insurance 611.31 4 * * *
19. Chicago Title & Trust 527.90 9 * * *
21. ConAgra, Inc. 684.58 1 11,277,100 2,471,700 24,002,100
23. DuPont 333.85 14 36,689,000 11,270,000 25,094,000
27. Entergy Corp. 355.87 12 27,000,700 7,031,971 9,561,721
28. Entergy Arkansas 217.50 24 4,106,877 1,186,659 1,715,714
34. First Chicago Corp. 240.18 21 114,096,000 7,960,000 10,098,000
38. Illinois Power Co. 620.09 3 5,291,500 1,299,100 1,773,900
39. Illinova Corp. 577.30 6 5,583,000 1,369,500 2,509,500
40. International Shipholding Corp. 244.94 20 618,204 282,085 391,056
43. Level 3 Communications 535.41 8 2,779,000 2,230,000 332,000
44. Magma Power 319.72 16 1,772,917 674,091 335,715
48. Morrison Knudsen 251.83 18 770,244 343,131 1,677,301
49. New Orleans Public Service 236.91 22 * * *
50. Northern Electric 319.00 17 * * *
55. Peter Kiewit & Sons' 537.97 7 2,779,000 2,230,000 332,000
56. RJR Nabisco 245.24 19 30,657,000 9,631,000 17,057,000
61. System Energy Resources 234.39 23 3,432,031 849,933 633,698
68. Valmont 595.11 5 368,052 207,102 622,506
*These subsidiary corporations do not report financial statements separate from the parent corporation. Data sources for col-
umns 4, 5, and 6: Moody's services listed in references.
Table 3. Power Structure Rank and Financial Position of the Twenty-Four
Dominant Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact
Corporations
Secondary Interlocks. A secondary interlock among corporations occurs where the direc-
tors from two corporate boards meet and plan together as members of the board of direc-
tors of a third corporation. An actual example is depicted as follows:
Board members from Bechtel and Peter Kiewit hold positions on the board of DuPont;
thus, Bechtel has a secondary interlock with Peter Kiewit through DuPont, as does Peter
Kiewit with Bechtel. Many studies calculate and include the corporate sets that are con-
nected on a secondary basis in determining each corporation’s ranking. The number of
secondary interlocks was not included separately in the analysis of the CIC power struc-
ture because all secondary connections are already included in one or more power blocs.
For example, the secondary set depicted above is part of the following power bloc:
If the reader is interested, the number of secondary interlocks for each of the 72 corpora-
tions is calculated and reported in column 3 of appendix A. They were calculated from
the 72 x 72 adjacency matrix with the computer program UCINET IV (Borgatti et al.
1992).
Initial Interlocks. An initial interlock is the situation where one or more of the board mem-
bers of one corporation serve on the board of a second corporation. This can, for exam-
ple, allow two large oligopolies to coordinate policies to undertake monopolistic
practices. However, an initial interlock does not, by itself, allow for the powerful collec-
tive networks such as those surrounding the CIC. Corporations build on the initial inter-
locks to assemble overlapping power blocs into an affiliated network. Therefore, initial
interlocks were not used as a separate measure to determine corporate rankings for the
corporations involved in the CIC network. Since many studies count the number of ini-
tial interlocks, the number for each of the 72 corporations is included in column 4 of
appendix A in case the reader is interested in the information. They were found by apply-
ing the computer program UCINET IV (Borgatti et al.) to the 72 x 72 matrix.
Officers on Other Corporate Boards. In some interlock studies, the top five corporate offi-
cers are included, along with the directors, even if the officers are not on the board of
their own corporation. Officers often serve on other boards even though not on their
own board. Officers were not included here except for those who served on their board
of directors. Had the others been included, the connections among corporations would
have been increased.
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Research: Review and Recommendations
Research Review
Concerns about interlocking directorships date back to the late 1800s. As the
degree, extension, and sophistication of corporate decision networks have evolved, so
have our concerns and studies. A man who could be depended upon early in the 1900s
to encourage studies and concern about, and to regularly speak out against, what he
called the “spider web of Wall Street” and “power trust for private greed” was
Nebraska’s US Senator George Norris (1945, 160). His spider-web poster (8 ft. by 8 ft.),
which he presented on numerous occasions, was a diagram of how the major corpora-
tions were directly connected through board interlocks to the large central Wall Street
financial institutions. In the 1930s, Gardiner C. Means was the first to complete a study
of the interlocking directorships of the 250 largest US corporations in an adjacency
matrix format, showing the number of directors shared by corporations in each cell and
arranging the matrix rows and columns by the corporations’ interest groups, such as the
JP Morgan, DuPont, and Chicago interest groups (Means 1939).
John Munkirs and James Sturgeon concentrated their studies on the banking,
insurance, automobile, and petroleum interest groups and found that the corporations
in the industries functioned as “cooperative oligopolies” (Munkirs et al. 1993; Munkirs
and Sturgeon 1985; Munkirs 1985). Munkirs and Sturgeon’s work sets aside Chamber-
lain’s kinked-demand theory, in which oligopolistic corporations knew of their mutual
interdependence but only considered explicit market acts of others and did not overtly
coordinate their activities. Instead, Munkirs and Sturgeon found that corporations with
interdependent financial, technological, and market interests networked their direc-
tors, decision making, equity, production plans, research, and so forth.
In recent decades, the cohesive interdependence of corporations has been explicitly
recognized by researchers as well as by policy makers, and the research agenda regarding
the corporate networks has become extensive. Corporate power has been a common
concern of their studies, which have found that a corporation’s position within a system
of interconnected corporate organizations determines power (Domhoff 1990; Munkirs
1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi 1982). Structural sources of power reflect the
system rather than particular attributes of any particular firm (Brass and Burkhardt
1993; Astley and Sachdeva 1984). Studies evolved to more refined definitions and mea-
sures of centrality, hierarchy, closeness, dominance, reachability, and so forth (Trebing
and Estabrooks 1998; Munkirs 1985; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Dooley 1969). While
the concerns grew, matrix manipulation techniques based on Boolean algebra (Hage
and Harary 1983; Bonacich 1972, 1987) became available for deriving coefficients for
limited reachability (through a prespecified number of corporations), reachability
(number of step connections between each corporation), centrality, degree, and close-
ness (Stephenson and Hayden 1995; Hayden and Stephenson 1993; Stephenson and
Zelen 1989; Freeman 1979). In turn, these matrix coefficients have been utilized in con-
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junction with various kinds of other measures to study various kinds of corporate issues,
thereby leading to a greater understanding of the effectiveness of corporations to coordi-
nate policy across a power structure.
Because of the detailed empirical base available from the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding corporations, the literature has been enriched
by sociologists and management scientists who have concentrated on studying corpora-
tions to test and develop general inter- and intra-organizational structure and network
theories. The literature about corporate power structures is far too extensive and diverse
to summarize, but, as a sample, it includes studies on the influence of board interlocks
on strategies; alliance formation; performance effects of corporations in networks;
structural position and the use of behavioral tactics for power; a corporation’s network
centrality position and assertiveness, influence, and coalition formation; the effects of
organizational strategies and contextual constraints in corporate networks; corporate
social performance behavior; corporate illegal activity; and corporate capture of govern-
ment agencies (Hayden and Bolduc 2000; Gulati and Westphal 1999; Chung 1996;
Swanson 1995; Daboub et al. 1995; Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Boje and Whetten
1981). This literature has provided a base for understanding the effective coordination
practices among corporations. To build upon it for democratic policy making requires a
new research agenda.
Recommendations for Future Research
For citizens to have democratic control, research needs to be completed quickly
and actions taken rapidly in a real-time context prior to decisions being determined by
powerful corporate networks. With regard to the CIC, legislation was finalized, person-
nel appointed, contracts finalized, and contractors selected before citizens and politi-
cians knew the source of the influence and power. To use the language of John
Groenewegen, the CIC has been a victim of corporate capture. It is an example of pow-
erful firms capturing government and thereby determining policy and contracts
(Groenewegen 2000, 17). The power structure of corporate power blocs should be the
first information base established in order to determine the true magnitude of market
and political power. The public policy making arena is littered with government agen-
cies that have failed to construct policies and processes consistent with efficiently solv-
ing problems, because integrated translocked corporations had already captured the
decision-making process. Given the current mathematical techniques and computer
programs available, the definition and analysis of power structures is completed on a
historical basis. Studies of corporate interlocks take too long to complete in order for
their results to be known before decisions are made. Therefore, citizens do not get the
benefit of the analysis before decisions are made. They do not get to decide if a particu-
lar corporate network is the one which citizens want involved to help solve the problem
or to be in charge of the solution process.
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Mathematical and Computer Programming Needs. To successfully complete the kind of insti-
tutional and statistical analysis needed for general theory and to be able to determine
power-bloc structures in a timely manner, new matrix models and algorithms are needed
from combinatorial mathematics. “Methodologists have developed and employed vari-
ous techniques for identifying posterior cohesive subgroups from data indicating the
extent of interaction between pairs of actors” (Frank 1996, 97), and, as indicated above,
recent network analysis has employed graph-theoretic approaches for identifying and
measuring the influence of different cohesive subgroups in a system (Stephenson and
Hayden 1995; Hayden and Stephenson 1993; Borgatti et al. 1990; Everett 1983;
Mokken 1979; Seidman and Foster 1978; Alba 1973; and see the journal Social Net-
works). The network analysis to date, however, has not been based on the linear-quadru-
ple power bloc, where it is important to know both the number of blocs for each corpora-
tion as well as all the particular blocs in which each corporation is a member. The
algorithm of combinatorial mathematics needed for power-bloc analysis should not be
difficult, given the knowledge base already available in the mathematics of graph theory,
network analysis, canonical basis, and lattice theory. When the algorithm is established,
computer programs will be easy to construct that will identify power blocs in an adja-
cency matrix and convert them to alternate matrices in order to conduct further analysis.
Data about corporations in the United States is readily available. What are needed are
less calendar-consuming and labor-intensive analytical tools for relevant analysis. With-
out the new math and computer technology, the institutional analysis suggested below
will have little chance of being completed.
Political Subgovernments and Managerialism. The political science literature provides us
with the concept of subgovernments as an explanation of policy making. The concept of
subgovernments—also referred to as subsystems, iron triangles, special interest groups, or
policy monopolies—“is based on the observation that relatively small groups of actors
dominate certain sectors of the political system” (Duffy 1997, 4). Subgovernmental
groups typically consist of government bureaucrats in executive positions, a committee
or commission, and a special interest group. (This definition fits the CIC
subgovernment.) The subgovernment terms “refer to the tendency of policymakers to
gravitate into substantive issue alliances that cross institutional boundaries and include
both government and nongovernment actors” (McCool 1998, 551). Daniel McCool has
explained that “as a descriptive device, the subgovernment concept has been consistent
with what can be observed in policymaking. However, as an analytical tool, the concept is
limited because it is very difficult to move beyond the simple level of description” (1998,
555). Subgovernment analysts need to apply the concept of the power-bloc structure,
function, and hierarchy in order to advance the understanding of policymaking in the
modern world of overlapping institutions and organizations.6
The importance of the subgovernment paradigm reaches beyond the explanation
of policy making on individual policy issues. Willard Enteman explained what he called
“managerialism” as the new ideology that guides societal conduct and policy making.
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He explained that modern society has evolved into a system of overlapping organiza-
tions, such as among corporations, and between corporations and other social organiza-
tions (1993). Interorganizational coordination and joint decision making has become
the reality of our times. Since that is the way society functions, social beliefs have
evolved to direct institutional conduct consistent with that reality. A managerialist soci-
ety is one based on organization, with the inter- and trans-organizational relationships
serving as the social and economic decision-making process. According to Enteman,
managerialism does not pretend to be a form of democracy. “The managerialist society
is not one which responds to the needs, desires, and wishes of a majority of its citizens.
In a managerialist society, influence is exercised through organizations. The society
responds to whatever the management of various organizations can gain in their transac-
tions with each other” (Enteman 1993, 154). Although the managerialist thesis seems to
have legitimacy, especially when observing cross-institutional processes such as the CIC,
surprisingly, the managerialist thesis has not been integrated with the subgovernment
concepts, and the managerialist concept is not based on quantitative modeling or
empirical findings. The similarity and common affinity for the same concepts between
subgovernment and managerialist explanations would recommend cross-fertilization in
the future. The empirical testing of managerialism can be completed in a power-bloc
paradigm when dealing with corporate organizations.
Power-Bloc Time Series. Most studies on interlocking directorships, given that they are such
an arduous task, demonstrate the structure, hierarchy, centrality—or whatever the mea-
sures—for one year, which does not provide a database for trends, comparisons, and sta-
tistical analysis. With a new mathematical algorithm and computer program, the power
blocs of corporations, along with the sundry network measures, could be calculated
annually with the publication of the annual corporate submission of information to the
secretary.
Relationship to Other Organizational Overlaps. With annual calculations of power blocs and
annual calculations of their network-structure coefficients, it will be possible to complete
statistical analysis in order to compare directorship network structure with coefficients of
other integrated structures. For example, many corporations in a power structure own
each other’s stock. The relationships between a power-bloc structure and equity-owner-
ship structure need to be better understood; likewise, for finance, joint ventures,
subgovernment influence of government agencies, mergers, and so forth. Anecdotal evi-
dence, past studies, and a casual reading of The Wall Street Journal provide plenty of
hypotheses. Reading in the WSJ about recent CIC corporation mergers and joint ven-
tures that were intensely involved in the same family of power blocs makes for relation-
ship hypotheses. Further research should test such hypotheses. For example, as noted in
figure 2, Peter Kiewit and DuPont were found to share 106 power blocs. Therefore, it was
not surprising to read recently that the two had merged investment funds. There is a dif-
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ference, however, between “not being surprised” and being in a position to construct and
support a theory based on statistical analysis.
Statistical analysis should be a multi-variant analysis to compare the formal struc-
tural measures of various matrices with each other, for example, a comparison of the
structural measure of a power-bloc matrix like figure 5 above, with the structural mea-
sures of matrices of the same corporations for interlocking stock ownership, interlock-
ing campaign-finance contributions, interlocking bond ownership, and so forth. Do
structural changes in one matrix influence others? The statistical analysis can utilize a
statistical technique developed by John Gewecke (1982, 1984) in order to establish the
direction of causation between time series and thereby begin to explain the evolutionary
trends.7
Theory of the Firm. The theory of the firm is (1) usually presented in a manner that has no
relationship to modern corporate organizations or (2) completely ignored in treatises
dealing with corporate organizations. Neither should be the practice with regard to such
a dominant socioeconomic institution. Concerns regarding the theory of the firm are
numerous. Do we have reliable answers to many of them? No. For example, Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means, in 1932, emphasized the separation of corporate ownership and
decision making (1932, 69, 277). Robert Brady, in 1943, continued that thesis in his
book (1943, 209-228), and John Galbraith has conveyed that message during his distin-
guished career. However, observations we made during this study question that theory,
and we believe that it, at best, needs to be refined. From casual observation of SEC
reports, it appears that there is a high correlation between the pattern of interlocking
ownership and the pattern of distribution of power-bloc membership for CIC corpora-
tions. Future research needs to take us beyond casual observation. Other examples spring
to mind with regard to cost functions, demand generation, price control, and so forth.
What are the relationships of these to the structure of power blocs?
Globalization. Wolfram Elsner presented a general paradigm of the globalized economy
that is based on institutional networks which function at the macro, meso, and micro lev-
els to guide the economies of different regions and local settings. His explanation also
included specifics about future research needs—a research agenda for the profession
(2000a, 127-141; 2000b, 412-457). He explained that analysis should begin with the anal-
ysis of power in a cluster and network model. “Power, dominance, and dependence are
ubiquitous in industrial clusters and networks as they are in the socio-economy in gen-
eral. Spatial economic structures, therefore, will sooner or later adapt to these power con-
ditions, regardless of their subnational (i.e. regional), national or global extension”
(Elsner 2000b, 430-31). The CIC network is an example whereby the network of large
global corporations has dominated the decision-making functions and policies of a
regional compact regarding the spatial movements of resources and the disposal of radio-
active waste. This is consistent with what Elsner found to be the general global case. As
stated: “Corporate dominance/dependence structures and power relations in spatial
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clusters shape spatial networks” (Elsner 2000b, 431). The power-bloc approach can be
utilized in future research to define the power structures of global corporations which
make financial, investment, political, technological, and social decisions that influence
the economy and social system of a region.
Concluding Remarks
In their book on structural anthropology, Per Hage and Frank Harray emphasized
that the analysis of sets of social and cultural relations presupposes models (1983). Ken-
neth Frank reminded us that “the structure of interactions and the pattern of influence
in an organization can be characterized in terms of a map of interactions within and
between cohesive subgroups” (1996, 93). The set of structured relations modeled here
was for the CIC corporate power structure. The overall organization of the power struc-
ture was integrated through the interactions and patterns of influence defined between
cohesive corporate subgroups. The relations were modeled with overlapping power
blocs, each power bloc being four corporate boards that are linearly connected by inter-
locking directorships. The power bloc is utilized by corporations to formulate networks
of collusive decision making and action by the overlapping boards of directors. This
study applied the power-bloc concept to define the corporate network surrounding the
CIC and found the most intensive and extensive set of relationships among corporate
governing boards that has been found to date. A glance at figures 2 through 5 indicates
the cohesiveness of the power structure. Those figures convey a picture that has the
appearance of an impregnable fort; however, that interpretation is too narrow and staid.
The fort image connotes a stationary bastion of defense. Although a web of integrated
corporate power blocs makes for a strong defense, the corporate network is more impor-
tantly an offensive force. It is a dynamic system in constant motion—an advancing force
with extensive resources and political clout to expand its influence and, consequently,
its interests and holdings as it guides economic and political decisions.
To understand and explain social, economic, and technological phenomena, it is
imperative to articulate the corporate planning network that surrounds the phenomena
to be understood. This is especially true for technological systems adopted and guided
by networks dominated by public utilities, which is the case for the CIC low-level radio-
active waste decisions. The CIC is the victim of a set of corporate alliances that we have
come to expect. The prevailing corporate model today is one of powerful integrated con-
glomerates that have numerous horizontal ties with each other and government agen-
cies, and vertical ties with small-scale producers and contractors. The power-bloc
approach to describing and analyzing the horizontal directorship ties allows us to under-
stand more completely than in the past how tightly a governing network is woven.
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Appendix A
Additional Measures of Overlapped Directorships
among CIC Corporations
(1)
Corporation No. and Name
(2)
Sets of 4
Corps. in Star
Format
(3)
No. of
Secondary
Interlocks
(4)
No. of Initial
Interlocks
1. Aon Corp. 20 33 6
2. Alltel 4 12 4
3. Bechtel 1 9 2
4. Bell South Corp. 20 19 6
5. Berkshire Hathaway 220 23 12
6. Browning Ferris 20 13 6
7. Burlington Northern 84 32 9
8. Burlington Resources 220 23 12
9. Burlington Industries 1 10 2
10. Business Men's Assurance 4 13 4
11. Bridges Invest. Fund 1 6 2
12. Carolina Power 1 6 1
13. CalEnergy Co. Inc. 364 26 14
14. Chemfirst Inc. 1 15 2
15. Chemical Waste Mgt. Inc. 56 17 8
16. Central States Indemnity 1 17 2
17. Chase Manhattan 20 17 6
18. Chicago Title Insurance 286 31 13
19. Chicago Title & Trust 220 30 12
20. Citicorp 1 10 2
21. ConAgra Inc. 455 34 15
22. Duke Power 1 10 3
23. DuPont 84 27 9
24. DuPont Dow Elastomers 4 24 4
25. Electric Energy 1 13 2
26. Enterprise Shipping 1 9 1
(1)
Corporation No. and Name
(2)
Sets of 4
Corps. in Star
Format
(3)
No. of
Secondary
Interlocks
(4)
No. of Initial
Interlocks
27. Entergy Corporation 455 19 15
28. Entergy Arkansas 120 17 10
29. Energy Louisiana 56 15 8
30. Entergy Mississippi 56 15 8
31. Entergy International 120 17 10
32. Entergy London 120 17 10
33. First Commerce Corp. 35 17 7
34. First Chicago Corp. 10 27 5
35. Florida Power & Light 1 14 3
36. Gulf South Inc. 1 9 1
37. Guarantee Life Ins. 10 22 5
38. Illinois Power Co. 286 25 13
39. Illinova Corp. 220 24 12
40. Intern'l Shipholding Corp. 84 17 9
41. JP Morgan 1 9 2
42. Kansas City Power 20 18 6
43. Level 3 Communications 286 28 13
44. Magma Power 35 18 7
45. Merrill Lynch 1 9 2
46. Merchantile Bank of Kansas 10 23 5
47. Morgan Keegan 1 6 2
48. Morrison Knudsen 35 30 7
49. New Orleans Public Service 165 18 11
50. Northern Electric 35 18 7
51. National Comm. Bank Corp. 1 6 2
52. Omaha Public Power Dist. 1 2 1
53. Peco Energy 1 28 2
54. Peoples Energy Corp. 10 26 5
Continued on next page
(1)
Corporation No. and Name
(2)
Sets of 4
Corps. in Star
Format
(3)
No. of
Secondary
Interlocks
(4)
No. of Initial
Interlocks
55. Peter Kiewit & Sons' 364 29 14
56. RJR Nabisco 35 24 7
57. Securities Benefit Life 1 4 2
58. Santa Fe Energy Resources 4 13 4
59. ScaServices 1 12 2
60. Scana Corp. 4 14 4
61. System Energy Resources 165 18 11
62. Symantec Corp. 4 19 4
63. Southern Gulf Railway 56 15 8
64. Texas Comm. Bank National 10 14 5
65. Textron 4 17 4
66. Union Pacific Resources 4 20 4
67. Utility Holdings 1 15 1
68. Valmont 364 29 14
69. Waste Management Inc. 165 25 11
70. Western Resources 1 7 3
71. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 4 8 4
72. Zyco Corp. 1 15 2
Notes
1. The US Supreme Court found unconstitutional the requirement that states enter into com-
pacts or be forced to open low-level radioactive waste facilities, and not a single low-level radio-
active waste disposal facility has been opened pursuant to the legislation. Ten multistate
compacts, plus eight unaffiliated states, were formed across the nation, and for various sound
and sensible reasons, all compacts have ceased the pursuit of establishing a disposal site for
low-level radioactive waste except for one compact, the CIC.
2. Collecting information regarding boards of directors began early in 1999 prior to the submis-
sion by corporations to the US Securities and Exchange Commission of their Schedule 10-K
forms for 1998. Thus, 1997 was selected as the base year. However, in a few cases, 1996 infor-
mation was the latest year available. The references for directorship information from elec-
tronic sources are Directory of Corporate Affiliations (1998, 1999); Disclosure® Online Database
(1998, 1999); Edgar Plus (1998, 1999); Edgar Database (1998, 1999); Financial Post Directory of
Directors (1998, 1999); Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives (1998,
1999); Standard and Poor’s Corporation Descriptions Plus News (1998, 1999); and Thomson Bank
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Directory (1998, 1999). In addition, the Web sites of some corporations were consulted, such
as for privately held corporations and government-owned utilities.
3. Most mathematical modeling and computational techniques for applied work on
interorganizational graphs, cliques, and networks have been guided by communication the-
ory. Such models and techniques are usually the algorithms applied in corporate structure
studies. This assumes that corporate management is limited to the flow of information and
messages and that such flow determines power. Although communication paths are impor-
tant for effective power, they are not a substitute for the sets of affiliated boards with the
power to make decisions. A simple clique path may carry communication, but power grows as
more power blocs are conjoined.
4. There is an interest in “star” cliques, which is a quadruple of corporations in a star format as
follows:
Studies using the star approach find all the various stars for each corporation. This is very dif-
ferent from the linear quadruple. The connections of 20, 55, and 3 to 23 are only initial, or
direct, exchanges of directors; thus, each of 23’s initial connections is only the beginning of a
power bloc. However, in case the reader is interested in the number of stars of each of the 72
corporations, that number has been calculated and is included in column 2 of Appendix A.
The number of star sets was found by taking a set of three at a time for all the initial
interlocks of each corporation. The interest is in the number of distinct subsets of size x from
a population of size n where x is the three corporations connected to the vortex of the star and
n is the total number of initial interlocks to the center corporation. This can be found with
the following combinatorial formula:
( )
n
x
n
x n x



 ≡ −
!
! !
Thus, if a corporation has 8 initial interlocks in a row of the 72 x 72 matrix, the number of star
sets for that corporation, taking them 3 at a time is:
( ) ( ) ( )
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3 8 3
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1
40 320
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• • • • • • •
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5. Data and matrices not published here are available on the authors’ Web sites, or will be sent
upon request.
6. One referee suggested a major historical research project for political scientists to undertake
in order to answer the following question: To what extent were the overlapping networks of
power structures in the electric utility industry effective in arbitrating differences and achiev-
ing consensus about the desired shape of state utility bills? That is, were directors of corpora-
tions such as Peco, Illinois Power, Entergy, and so forth making essentially identical
arguments (reciting the same “talking points”) in discussions with legislators, governors, or
public service commission officials? That would be a major undertaking, but it poses an inter-
esting question with regard to the subgovernment thesis.
7. The statistical technique developed by John Geweke has been utilized very little by econo-
mists. To untangle bi-directional causality between time series, the Geweke technique takes
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into account any interdependence between the time series and takes into consideration the
direction and magnitude of the linear relationships between time series.
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